8 Abstract In nineteenth-century America, blacksmiths were a fixture in every vil-9 lage, town, and city, producing a diverse range of products from axes to wheels and 10 services from repairs to horse shoeing. In constructing his historical GNP accounts, 11 Gallman opted to exclude these ''jacks-of-all-trades'' from the manufacturing sec-12 tor, classifying them instead as part of the service sector. However, using estab-13 lishment-level data for blacksmiths from the federal censuses of manufactures for 14 1850, 1860, and 1870, we re-examine that choice and show that blacksmiths were 15 an important, if declining, source of manufactured goods. Moreover, as 16 quintessential artisan shops, a close analysis of their structure and operation helps 17 resolve several key puzzles regarding industrialization in the nineteenth century. As 18 ''jacks-of-all-trades,'' they were generally masters of none (except for their service 19 activities). Moreover, the historical record reveals that several of those who man-20 aged to achieve mastery moved on to become specialized manufacturers of that 21 specific product. Such specialized producers had higher productivity levels than 22 those calling themselves blacksmiths producing the same goods, explaining changes 23 in industry mix and the decline of the blacksmith in manufacturing.
1FL01
1 The 1900 census combined blacksmithing with wheelwrighting.
2FL01
2 Collection of sample data from the extant manuscripts of the nineteenth century censuses of 2FL02 manufacturing was begun by Bateman and Weiss (see 1981) and completed by Atack and Bateman. The 2FL03 Atack and Bateman samples pertain to the 1850 through 1880 census years, but we do not use the 1880 2FL04
sample. This is because, as explained in the text, we rely heavily on information that the Census collected 2FL05 on the specific products that blacksmith shops produced-information which was not collected by the 2FL06 1880 census. The basic sample data are available for download from https://my.vanderbilt.edu/ 2FL07 jeremyatack/data-downloads/. This paper also uses additional information on business organization (e.g., 2FL08
partnership, corporation) culled from the original Atack-Bateman data worksheets; see Atack (2014 Gallman's (1960) appendix gives the details of his estimation procedure. In the case of manufacturing, 3FL02 the basic sources are the federal censuses, starting in 1840. These were supplemented by various state 3FL03 censuses, which were used to interpolate to mid-points (e.g. 1854) between federal census dates.
4FL01 4 The six are blacksmithing, locksmithing, coppersmithing, whitesmithing (tin), gunsmithing, and 4FL02 carriage-smithing; see Gallman (1960) . As discussed in ''Appendix 2'' of this paper, not every hand trade 4FL03 was enumerated separately in every census.
5FL01 5 As we discuss later in the paper, an obvious problem with this logic is that median establishment size in 5FL02 manufacturing in 1850 was two workers and approximately 80% of establishments had five workers or 5FL03 fewer (Margo 2015, p. 221 ). Moreover, a clear majority of all establishments through 1880 (and beyond) 5FL04
were sole proprietorships and corporations were rare-even if their products were not (Atack 2014, 5FL05 Tables 17.1 and 17.2). We return to this point later in the paper. R CP R DISK 140 small (see Sect. 3 and ''Appendix 2''). Nevertheless, blacksmiths were important in 141 other ways to the evolution of nineteenth-century manufacturing, as we will show. 142 About a decade after his initial work appeared, matters were clarified when 143 Gallman published a co-authored paper with Thomas Weiss on the service sector 144 (Gallman and Weiss 1969) . Accepting Potter's point, Gallman and Weiss (1969, 145 p. 347) recognized that workers in the hand trades could be ''employees of 146 manufacturing establishments'' or they could have been laboring ''in small, 147 independent shops.'' Workers in ''independent'' shops might be crafting goods, or 148 they might be performing services, such as a blacksmith fixing a carriage wheel. 149 Gallman and Weiss agreed that the former activity should be included in 150 manufacturing, while the latter was clearly a service. The published census, 151 however, did not divide the gross value of output in the hand trades into physical 152 goods versus services making it impossible to determine how much of black-153 smithing output consisted of manufactures-plows, for example-versus services, 154 such as repairing broken tools or shoeing horses. Therefore, because Gallman had 155 previously excluded the hand trades from commodity output, the only practical 156 solution at the time was to put them in the service sector ''so that their contribution 157 does not go unrecorded'' (Gallman and Weiss 1969, p. 347) . 158 After the publication of the Gallman and Weiss article, the issue lays dormant for 159 three decades until the appearance of the paper by Jeremy Atack and Fred Bateman 160 announcing their samples from the surviving manuscripts of the nineteenth-century 161 manufacturing censuses (Atack and Bateman 1999) . In a brief discussion toward the 162 end of the paper, Atack and Bateman (1999, p. 187) used census information on 163 establishment outputs to point out that that blacksmiths ''produced a wide range of 164 goods that fully deserve to be called 'manufactured products''' such as ''pots and 165 pans … plows, fanning mills, hoes, scythes, knives, and wagons[.]'' thereby 166 agreeing with Potter (1960) ). Moreover, they used the product descriptions in the 167 census manuscripts (see below) to provide illustrative calculations of the 168 (sometimes substantial) contribution of blacksmiths to goods production. 169 Since most blacksmith shops were small and remained small, the historical 170 evolution of that industry may also be helpful in assessing the role of economies of 171 scale in nineteenth-century manufacturing. There is now a long literature making 172 use of establishment-level data from the manuscripts of the nineteenth-century 173 manufacturing censuses to estimate the parameters of production functions 174 econometrically, from which the extent of economies of scale can be calculated. 175 Early work, for example, Atack (1976 Atack ( , 1977 or Sokoloff (1984) found evidence of 176 economies scale, based on production function estimates, but a recent re-evaluation 177 of this earlier literature by Margo (2015) suggests that the finding of scale 178 economies is not robust. 179
The fundamental problem is that very small manufacturing establishments have 180 higher labor productivity in value-added terms than large establishments (Sokoloff 181 1984) . As we show later in the paper, this type of effect is clearly present among 182 blacksmiths but, by using the product information collected by Census, we can 183 make two points that have previously gone unremarked. First, we show that the very 184 smallest blacksmith shops had very different product mixes from larger shops. This 185 may be important for economies of scale estimation. Second, comparing output per value-added (output value minus input value) was negative, if the business produced less than $500 worth 6FL03 of (nominal) annual output (such establishments were not supposed to be included in the census) and 6FL04 those whose estimated rate of return lay in the upper or lower 1% (on the grounds that these were outliers 6FL05 and must have suspect data). Not only were blacksmith shops smaller than the norm in manufacturing, they 242 were also less productive in revenue terms. This is apparent in both Panels A and B, 243 by comparing the blacksmith share of total value added, which is always less than 244 the blacksmith share of employment, implying that output per worker was lower, on 245 average, in blacksmith shops than the average in manufacturing.
246
Panel C illustrates a basic conceptual problem with Gallman's (1960) original 247 decision to exclude the ''independent'' hand trades from manufacturing. If true 248 ''manufacturing'' only took place in larger establishments as opposed to ''indepen-249 dent shops''-defined as a sole proprietor, or a proprietor plus perhaps an 250 assistant-then the vast majority of establishments should have been dropped, even 251 in industries such as flour milling where there is no question whether the work force 252 was providing a service or making a product for sale. However, the published 253 census volumes for the earlier years in Gallman's analysis never included size 254 distributions of establishments, so there was simply no way for him to exclude 255 ''independent'' shops, except wholesale by industry (such as blacksmiths). But, as 256 Panel C shows, size alone cannot be the criterion for exclusion.
257
On the census forms that the enumerators submitted to Washington DC, they 258 reported the name of each manufacturing establishment that they visited. This 259 information was not encoded in the original Atack-Bateman samples primarily 260 because of technological constraints when the earliest data were collected. 7 It was, 261 however, recorded on the original worksheets (in the authors' possession) and 262 contains useful and useable information. These ''doing business as'' names for each 263 sample establishment have since been examined and categorized, although the 264 names themselves are still not attached to each sample observation. 8 They were 265 categorized as follows: an establishment doing business as, say, ''John Smith'' was 266 deemed a sole proprietorship while ''John Smith and Son(s)'' or ''John Smith and 267 George Smith'' was categorized as a family business. We classified businesses with 268 names like ''John Smith and Johan Schmidt'' as partnerships, distinguishing 269 between those businesses with just two individual's names and those with more than 270 two. Businesses whose name was impersonal or included the word ''mill,'' 271 ''factory'' (or similar), or ''corporation'' (or ''Co.'') were classified as incorporated, 272 for example ''The Ohio Iron Co.'' Virtually all such businesses were large. More 7FL01 7 Specifically, space was at a premium since the data had to be transferred to 80-column Hollerith punch 7FL02 cards after encoding for entry into the mainframe computer. Moreover, the primary scientific 7FL03 programming language of the time (FORTRAN) was not well suited to string manipulation.
8FL01
8 A few individual worksheets are missing from their worksheet folders-presumably these were 8FL02 removed at some point over the past fifty years or so to check information and not returned (or improperly 8FL03 filed). In these cases, the ''doing business as'' field has been coded as missing. 9 These businesses engaged an average of about 6 workers ( Table 2 , Panel 284 B). Businesses that we believe were incorporated, however, made up only 1.7% of 285 all manufacturing establishments in 1850, growing to just 3.9% by 1870, but they 286 generally had ten times as many employees per establishment as the sole 287 proprietorships. 288
If we restrict the sample to just those businesses identifying themselves as 289 blacksmiths, sole proprietorships made up about 90% of the business population in 290 that industry and these establishments had, on average, just two workers-likely the 291 blacksmith and a helper (to work the forge bellows, hold the metal punch, or clip the 292 softened iron, and so on). Moreover, the bulk of the remaining population of 293 blacksmiths were organized either as family concerns or partnerships and differed 294 little in size one from the other. 295
In collecting the manufacturing data, the census enumerators also quizzed 296 respondents regarding the types of products that each establishment produced, 297 as well as their quantity (if relevant) and value. This information was also 298 never tabulated by the Census, but most of it was encoded in the Atack-299 Bateman manufacturing samples and is central to our analysis. 10 The These inputs and outputs were converted to numeric codes for 306 type and units and are identified in the codebook to the Atack and Bateman 307 samples. When data collection was complete, the samples used a total of 1395 308 separate product codes and 1295 raw materials codes.
12 From census year to 309 census year, these codes grew more numerous and specific, suggesting that 310 manufacturers were increasingly particular and specific in describing the 311 products that they used and made-for example, anthracite coal rather than just 312 ''coal'' and ''rakes'' and ''plows'' rather than just ''agricultural implements.'' 313 We make extensive use of these final product codes in our analysis of 314 blacksmithing activities that follows.
315 4 The mix of services and manufacturing among blacksmiths 316 There were 83 separate final product codes used for blacksmiths (see ''Appendix 317 1''), covering a wide range of products and activities. We have collapsed these 318 into a set of six broad product categories-general blacksmithing (such as jobbing 319 and including horse shoeing); hardware (harness fittings, nails, hinges, latches, and 320 the like); implements (such as hoes, plows, rakes, and tools); iron work (like 321 fencing and generic ''iron work''); repair services; and carriages, wagons, and 322 wheels. Many blacksmith shops still produced more than one of these broadly 323 defined products.
324
Panel A of Table 3 shows the fraction of the gross value of the primary activity 325 (the first product listed in the census enumerations per instructions) as distributed 326 across the product category, along with the distribution of establishments. A solid 327 majority-two-thirds, for example, in 1850-of total blacksmith gross value (and, 328 for that matter, of blacksmith shops themselves) were engaged in what we call 329 ''general blacksmithing'' or repair services. Moreover, by 1870, the share of 11FL01
11 As previously noted, not all of this information made it into the original Atack-Bateman samples since 11FL02 the data were encoded on 80-column Hollerith punch cards-three cards per observation, one for labor, 11FL03 capital, power, location, etc., one for inputs, and one for outputs. Bateman and Weiss determined that no 11FL04 more than four inputs and output values, quantities and codes could be accommodated within the 11FL05 80-column space of a single card. However, since few establishments reported more than four inputs or 11FL06 outputs, they opted to consolidate the additional data from those few observations rather than add more 11FL07 (mostly blank) input and output cards per observation. When there were more than four distinct inputs or 11FL08 outputs listed, the values of the least important raw material inputs and outputs were aggregated and 11FL09 coded as ''miscellaneous'' as the fourth input or output. A similar practice must also have been adopted by 11FL10 the enumerators as they sometimes listed a ''miscellaneous'' category as the last input or output in their 11FL11 enumeration.
12FL01
12 In the public code book accompanying the Atack-Bateman sample (http://my.vanderbilt.edu/ 12FL02 jeremyatack/files/2011/08/MFGDOC.pdf), a few products have multiple codes that survived the data 12FL03 cleaning process so that the number of different products or raw materials is slightly less than reported in 12FL04 the text. The multiple codes are allowed for in assigning broad product categories. 330 blacksmith gross value classified as general blacksmithing or repairs had increased 331 to 85%, that is to say blacksmith shops became less specialized in specific product 332 production and more service-oriented over time. 333 Our general blacksmithing category is an amalgam of various activities. Some 334 of these were (mostly) quite specific services, such as shoeing horses, while others 335 were vaguely worded, such as ''jobbing,'' ''custom work,'' or simply (but 336 unrevealingly) ''blacksmith.'' Because of this, we have constructed two estimates 337 of the share of blacksmith gross value that can be attributed to manufacturing 338 activity, a lower bound and (plausibly) an upper bound. The lower bound assumes 339 that unless a specific good is mentioned, such as a plow or an axe, the blacksmith 340 was engaged entirely in supplying services. The upper bound excludes from the 341 calculation any product codes that are too vaguely worded to be plausibly and 342 clearly allocated to either services or manufactures, such as ''jobbing.'' 13 We 343 believe that these represent very conservative interpretations of the data and in 344 calculating these lower and upper bounds, we use all of the product codes listed in 345 the samples, not just the first (and primary) one, as shown in Panel A.
346
These lower and upper bounds on the fraction of the gross value of 347 blacksmith output that properly constituted manufacturing for the census years 348 1850-1870 are reported in Panel B. The ranges are fairly large-for example, in 349 1850, the lower bound estimate of the manufactures share is about 29%, whereas 350 the upper bound is 65%-because many blacksmiths reported one of their 351 activities as ''blacksmith.'' However, both the lower bound and upper bounds are 352 decreasing over time-robustly so, indicating that the blacksmith ''industry'' was 353 shifting strongly away from the production of manufactured goods and toward 354 services, consistent with Potter's (1960) conjecture. Moreover, the range is 355 narrowing over time.
356
The sharp decline in the manufactures share implies that Potter's (1960) criticism 357 of Gallman's (1960) decision to exclude the hand trades was conceptually correct. 358 Gallman understated the size of the manufacturing sector in 1850, and because the 359 hand trades were declining over time, he therefore overstates the growth of 360 manufacturing value added and productivity (output per worker). However, as we 361 show in ''Appendix 2'', the resulting bias in Gallman's estimates is very small and 362 can safely be ignored.
363
We previously noted that blacksmith shops, while always small on average, were 364 also becoming even smaller over time, counter to the general trend in manufacturing 365 (see, for example, Table 2 , Panel B). The fact that the shrinking in size was 366 occurring when blacksmiths were shifting toward services suggest that the two 367 features of behavior-size and product mix-could be related. Regression analysis 368 suggests that this was the case. Panel C of Table 3 reports the coefficient of the 369 manufactures share of value added (lower bound estimate) and the probability that a 370 blacksmith shop had at most two workers. The coefficient is negative and 371 statistically significant, regardless of whether we control for geographic location-372 urban status and state-which might also matter for the size distribution. Larger 373 blacksmith shops, in other words, had a product mix more tilted toward goods 374 production, while those shops that specialized in services were smaller. The next 13FL01 13 We refer to our upper bound as ''plausible'' in the text because we are assuming, plausibly, that 13FL02 blacksmiths who reported their activities as, for example, ''jobbing'' were disproportionately engaged in 13FL03 services. Our upper bound excludes values associated with these activities from the calculation, causing 13FL04 the manufactures share to be higher than its true value. Exclusions occur within observations (for 13FL05 example, a blacksmith listing ''jobbing'' as one of its product codes will have the value of this excluded 13FL06 from its total gross value) or across observations (the shop will be dropped from the calculation if all of its 13FL07 gross value is associated with product codes that cannot be clearly assigned to either manufacturing or 13FL08 services). mix, and industry endogeneity 379 A defining feature of nineteenth-century industrialization in the USA was the 380 growth of large-scale production. At the start of the century, the vast majority of 381 manufacturing took place in artisan shops but, by century's end, output and factors 382 of production had shifted toward factories (Atack 2014 ). The shifts toward large-383 scale production was driven by improvements in internal transportation and changes 384 in technology that created incentives for division of labor, and by greater access to 385 financial markets which provided the monetary grease so that firms could grow in 386 size. 387 It is a truism that economic historians believe that the shift toward large-scale 388 production contributed to the growth of labor productivity in manufacturing through 389 the exploitation of economies of scale. But using the primary source of data on 390 nineteenth-century American manufacturing-the censuses of manufacturing-to 391 document the existence of and measure the extent of economies of scale has proven 392 to be problematic. The basic problem is a ''small firm effect'' on productivity-the 393 smallest establishments, measured in terms of workers, have higher labor 394 productivity than larger establishments (Sokoloff 1984) . Moreover, in the economy 395 as a whole, labor productivity was higher in services than in manufacturing 396 (Gallman and Weiss 1969; Weiss 1967) . Is it possible that variations in the product 397 mix of businesses-especially if these establishments also produced services-398 might explain some of the ''small firm effect'' on labor productivity in 399 manufacturing? 400 Sokoloff attributed the small firm effect to an alleged under-reporting of 401 entrepreneurial labor in small firms which he ''fixed'' in the 1850 data by adding one 402 person to each establishment's workforce. With the fix in place, Sokoloff was able 403 to demonstrate the existence of fairly sizeable economies of scale based upon 404 production function estimates, even in non-mechanized establishments which he 405 attributed to pure division of labor-the specialization by individual workers in a 406 specific task or group of tasks. More recent analysis by Margo (2015) , however, 407 finds no evidentiary basis for Sokoloff's specific adjustment and concluded that 408 Sokoloff's conclusions were not robust.
409
A small firm effect is clearly present among blacksmiths. Column 1 of Panel A of 410 Table 4 reports the coefficients of a dummy variable equal to one if the number of 411 workers was one or two (i.e., was a small firm) from a panel regression of the log of 412 value added per worker. The regression also includes fixed effects for census year 413 (1860 and 1870), urban status, and the state in which the establishment was located. 414 The coefficient of the dummy variable is positive and highly significant. Thus, even 415 among blacksmiths, where there were relatively few large-scale establishments, the 416 smallest shops were still significantly more productive than larger shops. 
417
The product code information in the samples, however, provides a fresh insight 418 into what may be going on here. Specifically, we test whether the product mix 419 between services and goods manufacturing may explain the small firm effect. In 420 the aggregate nineteenth-century economy, we already know that output per 421 worker was highest in services (Weiss 1967) , and this differential may have 422 carried over within industries. As we showed in the previous section, the smallest 423 blacksmith shops had a product mix tilted toward services rather than toward good 424 production. 425 We can explore if this was the case by adding the product mix to the regression 426 specification.
14 The variable is measured such that larger values represent a higher 427 share of manufactures in the total. As can be seen in column 2 of Panel A, the 428 manufactures share is negatively related to output per worker, consistent with the 429 hypothesis that establishments that emphasized services had higher measured 430 productivity. Relative to larger establishments, the smallest blacksmith shops had a 431 product mix that favored services; and that, other factors held constant, the higher 432 the share of services in the product mix, the higher was output per worker. That said, 433 controlling for the product mix explains only a small portion of the small firm effect. 434 The ''small firm'' dummy is still positive and highly significant. 15 The last column 435 of Table 4 , Panel A adds the log of the capital-labor ratio to the regression. This 436 further reduces the effect of the small firm dummy as well, but the coefficient 437 remains positive and highly significant. 438
The product codes can also be used to compare the productivity of blacksmith 439 shops with establishments in other industries that produced the same good. One of 440 the most important examples involves agricultural implements. In the first half of 14FL01 14 For this purpose, we use the lower bound measure because this is defined for all product codes-and 14FL02 therefore, all blacksmith shops, whereas, as previously noted, the upper bound measure excludes activities 14FL03 for which the product code is too vaguely worded (''blacksmithing'') to assign to manufactures or 14FL04 services.
15FL01
15 At the suggestion of a referee, we conducted a sensitivity analysis in which we narrowed the sample in 15FL02 Panel A, Table 4 , to blacksmiths that reported producing a specific agricultural good, whether this was the 15FL03 first, second, third, or fourth product listed. This is a narrower test of the small firm effect because it 15FL04 substantially restricts the product mix by construction, unlike the regressions in Panel A of Table 4.  15FL05 There is only one good for which there are sufficient observations in the samples to estimate such a 15FL06 regression-plows. Specifically, we compute a variable, PLOWVAL, which is the sum of the total value 15FL07 of plows produced (first through fourth products listed), and restrict the sample to blacksmith shops for 15FL08 which PLOWVAL was positive (in any census year). There are 89 observations in this sample. The 15FL09 dependent variable is the log of the value of plows, and the critical independent variable is the small firm 15FL10 dummy (=1 if one or two; the regression also includes dummies for urban status, state, year, and linear 15FL11 terms in the log of the number of workers, the log of capital invested, and the log of the value of raw 15FL12 materials. The coefficient of the small firm dummy is positive (b = 0.147) which, consistent with the 15FL13 argument in the text, could be attributed to selection bias; however, the standard error is large 15FL14 (s.e. = 0.476), so the coefficient is (very) imprecisely estimated, and we cannot reject the hypothesis that 15FL15 it is statistically zero. We also conducted a similar exercise focusing on blacksmith shops that derived at 15FL16 least 50% of their gross revenue from the production of wagons; in this regression, the dependent variable 15FL17 is log of value added per worker, and the regression includes the small firm dummy, urban status, state, 15FL18 and linear terms in the log of the capital-labor ratio and the share of gross value derived from wagons. 15FL19 There are 50 observations in this sample. The coefficient on the small firm dummy is positive, and the 15FL20 coefficient of the share of gross value from wagons is negative, again consistent with the patterns 15FL21 observed in Panel A of Table 4 ; like the ''plows'' regression above, however, both coefficients have large 15FL22 standard errors, and we cannot reject the hypothesis that they are statistically zero. To make this productivity comparison, we limit the sample to those blacksmith 448 shops (SIC 769) whose primary activity was the production of a specific agricultural 449 implement, such as plows, as well as agricultural implements establishments (SIC 450 352) who did the same. Thus, in effect, we are holding constant what the 451 establishments in both industries considered to be their primary economic activity. 452 We have two dependent variables, the log of the gross value of the primary product, 453 and the log of the gross value of total output. Our interest is in the coefficient of a 454 dummy variable which takes the value one if the observation was a blacksmith shop 455 (SIC 769). All of the regressions include fixed effects for the census year and the 456 product code of the primary activity, and continuous variables in factor inputs (see 457 the notes to Panel B of Table 4) .
458
In part, our choice of comparing blacksmiths producing agricultural implements 459 with ''pure'' agricultural implements manufacturers was guided by sample size. 460 But, we are also cognizant of the case of John Deere, who operated as an 461 independent blacksmith until in the late 1830s when he invented a plow that 462 proved remarkably useful to Midwestern pioneer farmers. He subsequently formed 463 a partnership with Leonard Andrus in 1843 to build enough plows to meet robust 464 demand for his product, effectively abandoning his ''jack-of-all-trades'' black-465 smithing to specialize on producing his plows. That partnership was dissolved in 466 1848, and Deere moved his company to Moline, Illinois where it prospered and 467 grew in size (Broehl 1984) , eventually broadening its offerings of agricultural 468 implements beyond the plow. 16 
469
Our narrative of change over time in agricultural implements production implies 470 that the coefficient of the dummy variable for blacksmith shops should be 471 negative-that is, blacksmith shops were less productive than establishments in the 472 specialized industry. As can be seen in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 , the hypothesis is 473 strongly borne out, whether or not we include fixed effects for urban status and state 474 in the regression. We are calling this the ''John Deere effect'': holding the type of 475 good produced constant, the self-identified specialized producer of the good-476 agricultural implements, in this instance-had higher productivity, on average, than 477 blacksmiths making ostensibly the same product.
478
Although the regressions in columns 1 and 2 control for factor inputs, these 479 controls are not specific to the goods in question. Thus, it may be that blacksmith 480 shops that were specialized in agricultural implements production allocated less 481 labor, capital, and raw materials to producing such implements, relative to other 16FL01 16 There are other examples of well-known industrial firms that started as independent blacksmith shops, 16FL02 for example, Studebaker Brothers, which began as a blacksmith shop in the early 1850s, but soon 16FL03 specialized in wagons and carriages. The company grew dramatically during the Civil War as a 16FL04 consequence of military contracts with the Union Army (Erskine 1918), a couple of decades after Deere 16FL05 made the same kind of transition to specialist product producer. 525 relationship of the product mix to labor productivity. Over time the product mix 526 among blacksmiths shifted toward services and the typical blacksmith shop became 527 smaller, counter to the general trend in establishment size in manufacturing as a 528 whole. The product mix and size were also related in cross section-the smaller the 529 blacksmith shop, the higher was the share of output devoted to services. The product 530 mix also helps to explain some of the ''small firm effect'' present in nineteenth-531 century US manufacturing census data, the tendency for the smallest establishments 532 to have the highest value added per worker. However, much of the small firm effect 533 remains even after controlling for the product mix.
534
We also compare labor productivity of blacksmiths and in establishments in a 535 related industry, agricultural implements, controlling for the specific type of 536 implement that the establishment considered to be its primary output. We show that 537 blacksmiths were less productive than workers on average in the specialized 538 establishments, even when we control for the product mix. Taken together, these 539 two results on productivity help explain why blacksmith production of manufac-540 tured goods was displaced over time, but also why some shops were able to survive.
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Appendix 1
545 As indicated in the text, enumerators of the censuses of manufactures in 1850, 1860, 546 and 1870 were instructed to list up to six raw materials used in the production of up 547 to four individually identified final products. Specifically, the instructions stipulated 548 that:
549
''Under the general heading, entitled ''Annual products'' is to be inserted the 550 quantity, kind, and value of each produced during the whole year. It will 551 require great care to fill this column properly. When several articles are 552 manufactured, the first four only need be particularly specified, and the 553 remainder classed under a general heading of ''Other articles,'' and the 554 aggregate value of such articles carried out, the quantity being omitted; or, 555 where otherwise impracticable in any case, the aggregate value, without the 556 specific quantity or kind. In stating the value of the products, the value of the 557 articles at the place of manufacture is to be given, exclusive of the cost of 558 transportation to any market.'' [emphasis in original] (Wright 1900, p. 314)
559 The Bateman-Weiss coding scheme kept the spirit of these instructions within the 560 space constraints imposed by an 80-column Hollerith punch card. To achieve this, 561 they reduced the number of individually identified raw materials and final products 562 to a maximum of the four most important (by value). In those cases where more 563 than four inputs or outputs were identified, only the three most important by value 564 were identified by specific codes and the value of the remaining inputs or outputs 565 was aggregated, reporting that value under a code for ''Miscellaneous.'' Table 3. 19FL01 19 For example, Gallman considered ''carpentering'' to be a nonmanufacturing industry, putting it into 19FL02 construction instead. It is important to keep in mind that none of the non-manufacturing totals were 19FL03 ''lost''-they were simply put elsewhere in Gallman's national accounts. In the case of the hand trades, 19FL04 these went into services, as we pointed out in the text of our paper.
20FL01
20 For example, in 1850, blacksmithing accounted for 97.8% of total value of products in the six hand 20FL02 trades. Table 5 of ''Appendix 1''/Column 2, Table 6 ''Appendix 2'' 21FL01 21 The ratio figures in the last column of Table 5 are still too large because we are using the upper bound 21FL02 shares of gross value, rather than, say the average of the upper and lower bounds. Further, it is likely that 21FL03 the share of manufactures in value added in the hand trades is lower still, because manufacturing used 21FL04 more raw materials per dollar of gross value than services.
22FL01
22 We recognize that the typical blacksmith spent part of his time making manufactures and part of his 22FL02 time performing services; in effect, we are assuming that if the blacksmith spent half of his time making 22FL03 manufactures, this is the equivalent of 0.5 of a gainful worker. 
